# **Linux Foundation**

### **CKS Exam**

**Certified Kubernetes Security Specialist** 

Questions & Answers Demo

#### Question: 1

Create a new ServiceAccount named backend-sa in the existing namespace default, which has the capability to list the pods inside the namespace default.

Create a new Pod named backend-pod in the namespace default, mount the newly created sa backendsa to the pod, and Verify that the pod is able to list pods.

Ensure that the Pod is running.

Answer: See the Explanation below:

Explanation:

A service account provides an identity for processes that run in a Pod.

When you (a human) access the cluster (for example, using kubectl), you are authenticated by the apiserver as a particular User Account (currently this is usually admin, unless your cluster administrator has customized your cluster). Processes in containers inside pods can also contact the apiserver. When they do, they are authenticated as a particular Service Account (for example, default).

When you create a pod, if you do not specify a service account, it is automatically assigned the default service account in the same namespace. If you get the raw json or yaml for a pod you have created (for example, kubectl get pods/<podname> -o yaml), you can see the spec.serviceAccountName field has been automatically set.

You can access the API from inside a pod using automatically mounted service account credentials, as described in <u>Accessing the Cluster</u>. The API permissions of the service account depend on the <u>authorization plugin and policy</u> in use.

In version 1.6+, you can opt out of automounting API credentials for a service account by setting automountServiceAccountToken: false on the service account: apiVersion: v1 kind: ServiceAccount metadata: name: build-robot automountServiceAccountToken: false ... In version 1.6+, you can also opt out of automounting API credentials for a particular pod: apiVersion: v1

kind: Pod metadata: name: my-pod spec: serviceAccountName: build-robot automountServiceAccountToken: false

The pod spec takes precedence over the service account if both specify a automountServiceAccountToken value.

#### **Question: 2**

...

Fix all issues via configuration and restart the affected components to ensure the new setting takes effect.

Fix all of the following violations that were found against the API server:-

a. Ensure the --authorization-mode argument includes RBAC

b. Ensure the --authorization-mode argument includes Node

c. Ensure that the --profiling argument is set to false

Fix all of the following violations that were found against the Kubelet:-

a. Ensure the --anonymous-auth argument is set to false.

b. Ensure that the --authorization-mode argument is set to Webhook.

Fix all of the following violations that were found against the ETCD:-

a. Ensure that the --auto-tls argument is not set to true

Hint: Take the use of Tool Kube-Bench

#### Answer: See the Explanation below.

**Explanation:** API server: Ensure the --authorization-mode argument includes RBAC Turn on Role Based Access Control. Role Based Access Control (RBAC) allows fine-grained control over the operations that different entities can perform on different objects in the cluster. It is recommended to use the RBAC authorization mode. Fix - Buildtime **Kubernetes** apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: creationTimestamp: null labels: component: kube-apiserver tier: control-plane name: kube-apiserver namespace: kube-system spec: containers: - command: + - kube-apiserver + ---authorization-mode=RBAC,Node

image: gcr.io/google\_containers/kube-apiserver-amd64:v1.6.0 livenessProbe: failureThreshold: 8 httpGet: host: 127.0.0.1 path: /healthz port: 6443 scheme: HTTPS initialDelaySeconds: 15 timeoutSeconds: 15 name: kube-apiserver-should-pass resources: requests: cpu: 250m volumeMounts: - mountPath: /etc/kubernetes/ name: k8s readOnly: true - mountPath: /etc/ssl/certs name: certs - mountPath: /etc/pki name: pki hostNetwork: true volumes: - hostPath: path: /etc/kubernetes name: k8s - hostPath: path: /etc/ssl/certs name: certs - hostPath: path: /etc/pki name: pki

Ensure the --authorization-mode argument includes Node

Remediation: Edit the API server pod specification file /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kubeapiserver.yaml on the master node and set the --authorization-mode parameter to a value that includes Node. --authorization-mode=Node,RBAC Audit: /bin/ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver | grep -v grep Expected result: 'Node,RBAC' has 'Node'

Ensure that the --profiling argument is set to false

Remediation: Edit the API server pod specification file /etc/kubernetes/manifests/kube-

apiserver.yaml on the master node and set the below parameter. --profiling=false Audit: /bin/ps -ef | grep kube-apiserver | grep -v grep Expected result: 'false' is equal to 'false' Fix all of the following violations that were found against the Kubelet:-Ensure the --anonymous-auth argument is set to false. Remediation: If using a Kubelet config file, edit the file to set authentication: anonymous: enabled to false. If using executable arguments, edit the kubelet service file /etc/systemd/system/kubelet.service.d/10-kubeadm.conf on each worker node and set the below parameter in KUBELET\_SYSTEM\_PODS\_ARGS variable. --anonymous-auth=false Based on your system, restart the kubelet service. For example: systemctl daemon-reload systemctl restart kubelet.service Audit: /bin/ps -fC kubelet Audit Config: /bin/cat /var/lib/kubelet/config.yaml Expected result: 'false' is equal to 'false'

2) Ensure that the --authorization-mode argument is set to Webhook.

Audit

docker inspect kubelet | jq -e '.[0].Args[] | match("--authorization-mode=Webhook").string' Returned Value: --authorization-mode=Webhook

Fix all of the following violations that were found against the ETCD:-

a. Ensure that the --auto-tls argument is not set to true

Do not use self-signed certificates for TLS. etcd is a highly-available key value store used by Kubernetes deployments for persistent storage of all of its REST API objects. These objects are sensitive in nature and should not be available to unauthenticated clients. You should enable the client authentication via valid certificates to secure the access to the etcd service.

Fix - Buildtime Kubernetes apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: annotations: scheduler.alpha.kubernetes.io/critical-pod: "" creationTimestamp: null labels: component: etcd tier: control-plane name: etcd namespace: kube-system spec: containers: - command: + - etcd + - --auto-tls=true image: k8s.gcr.io/etcd-amd64:3.2.18 imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent livenessProbe: exec: command: - /bin/sh - -ec - ETCDCTL\_API=3 etcdctl --endpoints=https://[192.168.22.9]:2379 -cacert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/ca.crt --cert=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/healthcheck-client.crt -key=/etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd/healthcheck-client.key get foo failureThreshold: 8 initialDelaySeconds: 15 timeoutSeconds: 15 name: etcd-should-fail resources: {} volumeMounts: - mountPath: /var/lib/etcd name: etcd-data - mountPath: /etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd name: etcd-certs hostNetwork: true priorityClassName: system-cluster-critical volumes: - hostPath: path: /var/lib/etcd type: DirectoryOrCreate name: etcd-data - hostPath: path: /etc/kubernetes/pki/etcd type: DirectoryOrCreate name: etcd-certs status: {}

#### **Question: 3**

Create a PSP that will prevent the creation of privileged pods in the namespace.

Create a new PodSecurityPolicy named prevent-privileged-policy which prevents the creation of privileged pods.

Create a new ServiceAccount named psp-sa in the namespace default.

Create a new ClusterRole named prevent-role, which uses the newly created Pod Security Policy prevent-privileged-policy.

Create a new ClusterRoleBinding named prevent-role-binding, which binds the created ClusterRole prevent-role to the created SA psp-sa.

Also, Check the Configuration is working or not by trying to Create a Privileged pod, it should get failed.

### Answer: See the Explanation below.

Explanation: Create a PSP that will prevent the creation of privileged pods in the namespace.

\$ cat clusterrole-use-privileged.yaml

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: ClusterRole metadata: name: use-privileged-psp

rules:

- apiGroups: ['policy']

resources: ['podsecuritypolicies']

verbs: ['use']

resourceNames:

- default-psp

----

```
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: privileged-role-bind
namespace: psp-test
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: ClusterRole
name: use-privileged-psp
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: privileged-sa
$ kubectl -n psp-test apply -f clusterrole-use-privileged.yaml
After a few moments, the privileged Pod should be created.
```

Create a new PodSecurityPolicy named prevent-privileged-policy which prevents the creation of privileged pods.

apiVersion: policy/v1beta1 kind: PodSecurityPolicy metadata: name: example spec: privileged: false # Don't allow privileged pods! # The rest fills in some required fields.

```
seLinux:
rule: RunAsAny
supplementalGroups:
rule: RunAsAny
runAsUser:
rule: RunAsAny
fsGroup:
rule: RunAsAny
volumes:
- '*'
```

```
And create it with kubectl:
kubectl-admin create -f example-psp.yaml
Now, as the unprivileged user, try to create a simple pod:
kubectl-user create -f- <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: pause
spec:
containers:
 - name: pause
   image: k8s.gcr.io/pause
EOF
The output is similar to this:
Error from server (Forbidden): error when creating "STDIN": pods "pause" is forbidden: unable to
validate against any pod security policy: []
Create a new ServiceAccount named psp-sa in the namespace default.
```

```
$ cat clusterrole-use-privileged.yaml
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
name: use-privileged-psp
rules:
- apiGroups: ['policy']
resources: ['podsecuritypolicies']
verbs: ['use']
resourceNames:
- default-psp
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
 metadata:
  name: privileged-role-bind
  namespace: psp-test
```

roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: ClusterRole
name: use-privileged-psp
subjects:
kind: ServiceAccount
name: privileged-sa
\$ kubectl -n psp-test apply -f clusterrole-use-privileged.yaml
After a few moments, the privileged Pod should be created.

Create a new ClusterRole named prevent-role, which uses the newly created Pod Security Policy preventprivileged-policy.

apiVersion: policy/v1beta1 kind: PodSecurityPolicy metadata: name: example spec: privileged: false # Don't allow privileged pods! # The rest fills in some required fields. seLinux: rule: RunAsAny supplementalGroups: rule: RunAsAny runAsUser: rule: RunAsAny fsGroup: rule: RunAsAny volumes: \_ '\*' And create it with kubectl: kubectl-admin create -f example-psp.yaml Now, as the unprivileged user, try to create a simple pod: kubectl-user create -f- <<EOF apiVersion: v1 kind: Pod metadata: name: pause spec: containers: - name: pause image: k8s.gcr.io/pause EOF The output is similar to this: Error from server (Forbidden): error when creating "STDIN": pods "pause" is forbidden: unable to validate against any pod security policy: []

Create a new ClusterRoleBinding named prevent-role-binding, which binds the created ClusterRole

prevent-role to the created SA psp-sa.

apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 # This role binding allows "jane" to read pods in the "default" namespace. # You need to already have a Role named "pod-reader" in that namespace. kind: RoleBinding metadata: name: read-pods namespace: default subjects: # You can specify more than one "subject" - kind: User name: jane # "name" is case sensitive apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io roleRef: # "roleRef" specifies the binding to a Role / ClusterRole kind: Role #this must be Role or ClusterRole name: pod-reader # this must match the name of the Role or ClusterRole you wish to bind to apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1 kind: Role

metadata: namespace: default name: pod-reader

rules:

 - apiGroups: [""] # "" indicates the core API group resources: ["pods"] verbs: ["get", "watch", "list"]

#### Question: 4

Given an existing Pod named test-web-pod running in the namespace test-system

Edit the existing Role bound to the Pod's Service Account named sa-backend to only allow performing get operations on endpoints.

Create a new Role named test-system-role-2 in the namespace test-system, which can perform patch operations, on resources of type statefulsets.

Create a new RoleBinding named test-system-role-2-binding binding the newly created Role to the Pod's ServiceAccount sa-backend.

Answer: Send us your feedback on this.

#### **Question: 5**

Enable audit logs in the cluster, To Do so, enable the log backend, and ensure that 1. logs are stored at /var/log/kubernetes-logs.txt.

2. Log files are retained for 12 days.

- 3. at maximum, a number of 8 old audit logs files are retained.
- 4. set the maximum size before getting rotated to 200MB
- Edit and extend the basic policy to log:
- 1. namespaces changes at RequestResponse
- 2. Log the request body of secrets changes in the namespace kube-system.
- 3. Log all other resources in core and extensions at the Request level.
- 4. Log "pods/portforward", "services/proxy" at Metadata level.
- 5. Omit the Stage RequestReceived

All other requests at the Metadata level

## Answer: See the explanation below:

Explanation:

Kubernetes auditing provides a security-relevant chronological set of records about a cluster. Kubeapiserver performs auditing. Each request on each stage of its execution generates an event, which is then pre-processed according to a certain policy and written to a backend. The policy determines what's recorded and the backends persist the records.

You might want to configure the audit log as part of compliance with the CIS (Center for Internet Security) Kubernetes Benchmark controls.

The audit log can be enabled by default using the following configuration in cluster.yml: services:

kube-api:

audit\_log:

enabled: true

When the audit log is enabled, you should be able to see the default values at /etc/kubernetes/audit-policy.yaml

The log backend writes audit events to a file in <u>JSONlines</u> format. You can configure the log audit backend using the following kube-apiserver flags:

--audit-log-path specifies the log file path that log backend uses to write audit events. Not specifying this flag disables log backend. - means standard out

--audit-log-maxage defined the maximum number of days to retain old audit log files

--audit-log-maxbackup defines the maximum number of audit log files to retain

--audit-log-maxsize defines the maximum size in megabytes of the audit log file before it gets rotated If your cluster's control plane runs the kube-apiserver as a Pod, remember to mount the hostPath to the location of the policy file and log file, so that audit records are persisted. For example:

--audit-policy-file=/etc/kubernetes/audit-policy.yaml \

--audit-log-path=/var/log/audit.log